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Mark Tushnett
In  this brief Response,  Professor Tushnet describes Professor
Carter's  position as a theologically grounded critique of accommodations
of religion.  He elaborates that critique  by exploring several ways in which
accommodations of religion  threaten religious  people and institutions  that
accept them, even voluntarily.
I am pleased to welcome  Professor Carter to the (unfortunately thin)
ranks of skeptics about the entire project of defending the propriety of ac-
commodations of religion.1 There are, of course, some skeptics whose con-
cerns  arise  from  a  quite  general  strict  separationist  view  of  the
Constitution. But Professor  Carter joins a different  group, those  with es-
sentially theological  rather than constitutional  concerns  about accommo-
dations of religion. In this brief Response, I will elaborate somewhat  on
what I take to be the theological case against accommodation.2
We can begin by distinguishing between two kinds of concerns. The
first is that accommodations  are bad for religions, the second, that they op-
erate in a domain that religion ought to understand as irrelevant to itself.
The concern that accommodations  are bad for religion rests largely on
historical experience that demonstrates  (to those who have this concern)
that the State is not religion' s friend,3 even when it superficially appears to
be.4  I  believe  that  the  historical  argument  underlies  much  of  the
Copyright © 1999 California Law Review, Inc.
t  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I
thank Steve Goldberg for his comments on a draft of this brief essay.
1.  For my  earlier  discussions  of the  issue,  see Mark Tushnet,  The Emerging Principle of
Accommodation of  Religion (Dubitante),  76 GEO.  L.J. 1691  (1988);  Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of
Free  Exercise Discourse 1993  BYU L. REv.  117  [hereinafter  Tushnet, Rhetoric of Free Exercis];
Mark Tushnet, The  Underside of Mandatory Accommodations of Religion, 26  CAP.  U.  L. REv.  1
(1997); Mark Tushnet,  Will Context-Dependent  Balancing  Do the Job We Want Done?, CoNN. L. Rv.
(forthcoming 1999)  [hereinafter Tushnet, Context-Dependent  Balancing].
2.  I focus on the accommodation issue because, as Professor Carter points out, it is the area of
most current interest. I note,  however, that Professor Carter's  strictures  on the "neutrality"  analysis
track rather closely some critiques of the Court's disparate impact jurisprudence  more generally,  in
such areas as free expression,  equal protection, and the dormant commerce clause.
3.  Throughout,  I capitalize State to  emphasize  that I am here  concerned  with all  forms of
worldly government, not merely the government of the United States or of any of its components.
4.  One thinks  here of Shakespeare's -observation that a person "may smile and smile and be a
villain." WILLAm  SHAxESPEARE, HA.MET.  act 1.  sc. 5.
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separationist impulse expressed  in traditional Jewish and Baptist thinking
about establishments of religion. Here I identify two aspects of the histori-
cal argument with the aim of showing that the historical argument, while
not insubstantial, will not in the end  sustain the weight of a full-fledged
anti-accommodationist conclusion.
First, one might be concerned that the State is not religion's perma-
nent friend. That is,  no matter what accommodations  the State presently
provides, in the long run, religions now benefiting from accommodations
will find the State turning against them. As Professor Carter suggests,  ac-
commodations  always have some limits, and a religion that has grown ac-
customed  to  having  its  concerns  accommodated  may  be  particularly
disappointed  when it presses  its concerns  beyond the limits  the State is
willing to recognize.'  Still, one might think that short-term or interim bene-
fits of accommodations are better than none at all. No matter how small the
domain in which the State is religion's friend, and no matter how briefly it
may be so, still, within that domain and for that period, religion is better
off than it would be had the State never been religion's friend in any way.
This conclusion might be too hasty, however. Difficulties arise in two
directions. As I have mentioned, believers may be disappointed when the
State's accommodations reach their limit, and that disappointment may be
more damaging to their belief than living with the knowledge that the State
will never accommodate  their beliefs and practices.  From the State's side,
accommodations  of religion may make it too easy  to overlook the harm
done when it denies an accommodation.  The best example in the constitu-
tional law of accommodations is Justice O'Connor's opinion in the peyote
case.'  She rejected the Court's position that neutral laws of general  appli-
cability were constitutionally permissible without regard to their impact on
religious exercise,  and would have required that such laws promote a com-
pelling state interest in an appropriately  well-defined  way.7 But, she con-
cluded, the government in the peyote case did have a compelling interest in
suppressing  psychoactive  drugs, which would be advanced by barring the
use of peyote  in religious exercises  Here Justice O'Connor presents her-
self as a friend of religion, but when asked to take religion's claims  seri-
ously,  she instead  finds the  State's interests  more  compelling.  And the
mere possibility that in some other case she would require the government
to accommodate religious belief and practice allows her to take comfort in
thinking that she is, after all, a humane person  who would not uphold un-
necessary state intrusions on religious exercise.'
5.  See Stephen  L.  Carter, Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A  Tribute to Justice
Brennan, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 1059, 1071  (1999).
6.  See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7.  See id. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J.,  concurring in the judgment).
8.  See id.
9.  For additional comment, see Tushnet, Rhetoric of  Free  Exercise, supra  note  1.
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Second, religion may find accommodations  seductive. Because they
rarely come with no strings attached,0  some religious institutions will find
the benefits  of accommodations  so attractive that they will change to ac-
commodate  public  demands.1  And  yet,  as  Professor  Carter  points  out,
there  can be no objection from within religion to religious change,  even
change induced by the availability of public benefits. 12 Religions necessar-
ily negotiate  their way through the non-religious  world, and they are in-
evitably  changed  as they  do so.  Changes  induced by the availability  of
accommodations  are no different,  and no more troubling, than changes  in-
duced by the existence of television or automobiles.13
Here I have a quibble with Professor Carter's presentation, perhaps
more with one aspect of his formulation than with his broader point. As he
has elsewhere, Professor Carter emphasizes religion's role in opposition to,
and as subversive of, claims of State authority.
14 Accommodations  of re-
ligion induce  religious  change by providing  incentives to alter religious
practice so as to make the accommodation  available. Yet introducing the
language of incentives may be misleading if it suggests, as Professor Carter
does at one point, that we ought to worry about the incentives religion has
to subvert  state authority. t5  Such a formulation has inappropriate  conse-
quentialist overtones.  Religion's subversive potential  is not a matter of in-
centives, of actions taken in response to options made available. A person
who truly believes cannot-simply  cannot-be induced, to change  his or
her beliefs.6 Critics of State actions that impose costs on religious exercise
10.  For example, to receive the teaching assistance from public school teachers made available to
religiously affiliated schools in New York by the Court's  decision inAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997), regulations required  the schools to remove all religious symbols from the classrooms in which
the public school teachers work. See id. at 211,234-35.
11.  In any event, even devoting time to considering  whether to accept the accommodation with
its strings reduces the time the institution has to  act as  a religion, for example,  by providing pastoral
counseling. For a somewhat more extended analysis, see Tushnet, Context-Dependent  Balancing,  supra
note 1.
12.  See Carter, supra note 5, at 1074. 1 note the possibility that some strings might be challenged,
and  perhaps invalidated,  as  unconstitutional  conditions.  The law of unconstitutional  conditions  is
notoriously murky, and, in any event,  some strings surely will be upheld, which is sufficient to sustain
my general analytic point.
13.  I have in mind here the transformations that have occurred in denominations like the Amish
and the Mennonites. Professor Carter's example of the Mormon  adaptation to governmental pressure
(to  put  it far  more  benignly  than  may  be  appropriate)  to abandon  polygamy  is  another  such
transformation. And, as he stresses, that transformation occurred from within the religion; it resulted
from a revelation of the sort to which the religion itself gave normative weight.
14.  See Carter, supra note 5, at 1060.
15.  See id.
16.  This is not to say that truly held religious beliefs cannot change, only that they  cannot change
by the operation of incentives; they can change through the methods that each religion acknowledges  as
a basis for belief (revelation or reasoning, for example).  And I suppose there may be religions  with
beliefs that allow for religious change in response to external  incentives, whether positive or negative.
For those religions, the problems I address  here would not arise. But I do wonder whether there are
many religious people who would acknowledge that their religious beliefs are of this sort.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
note the harm that occurs when a believer responds to negative incentives
by  altering his  or her religious  beliefs. 7  Exactly  the  same harm  occurs
when believers respond to the positive incentives made  available  by  ac-
commodations  of religion, or by the possibility  of obtaining such accom-
modations if religious belief changes.
What  is at stake is something  ontological,  an  aspect of religion  as
such and independent of any social arrangement. The ontological status of
religion  is  the  second  broad  ground  on  which  the  theological  anti-
accommodationist  position rests.  Here the State is just irrelevant  to relig-
ion. The State is a way in which we and some of our sisters and brothers
organize ourselves to accomplish some goals. But it operates in an entirely
different domain from religion;  there are no points of contact between  the
domains  of religion and government  that are of interest to religion.'8  Of
course this is not to say that the State's coercive or seductive power cannot
impose itself on people who hold religious beliefs. Rather, the point here is
that doing things to people cannot do anything to religion. 9
For me,  the most developed  articulation  of this position  is  Stanley
Hauerwas' s celebrated essay, A  Christian  Critique of Christian  America. 20
Hauerwas describes  school prayer, the focus of his essay, as "theologically
a  scandal"'"  because  state-sponsored  prayer  "cannot  help  but give  the
impression that the State is friendly toward religion,"'  and that impression
is false.  Hauerwas  contrasted  his position  with that  of his friend  John
Howard Yoder, a Mennonite who drew from his denomination's  historical
experience  the lesson  that  one could  seek  accommodations  and accept
them when offered, albeit always aware that the accommodations tendered
by the State would never be sufficient to satisfy the demands religion can
place on believers.'  As Hauerwas put it, Yoder would allow  for a prag-
matic,  case-by-case judgment about whether to use the State's language
17.  A careful  analysis  is Elizabeth  Harmer-Dionne,  Note, Once a Peculiar People:  Cognitive
Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon  Polygamy  As  a Case  Study Negating  the Belief-Action
Distinction,  50 STAN.  L. REv. 1295 (1998).
18.  I  am fond  of citing James  Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance in  support of this
proposition, although I acknowledge  that my reading of Madison may not be faithful to Madison's  own
understanding. Madison wrote, "It is the duty of every  man to render to the Creator such homage, and
such only, as he believes  to be acceptable  to him.  This duty is precedent  both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."  JAMES  MADISON,  Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments § 1, in  THE  COMPLETE  MADISON  300 (Saul K. Padover ed.,  1953)
(emphasis added) (originally published 1785).'
19.  This is  true even  when the State's view of the matter is that  it is doing  things  to people
because of their religious beliefs or practices.
20.  Stanley Hauerwas, A  Christian Critique of  Christian  America, in RELIGION,  MORALITY,  AND
THE LAW  110 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
21.  Idatlll.
22.  Id.
23.  See id at 121-26.
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against  it. 24  Hauerwas  thought  this  insufficiently  strenuous.  I  take
Hauerwas's position to be that a believer can accept accommodations when
they are offered, but ought not ask for them. It is up to the State, not the
believers, to decide how to deal with believers:  Believers should not place
themselves in the position of supplicants seeking the State's permission to
do something their religion requires of them no matter what.
Now I depart from what Hauerwas expressly wrote. I would put the
point in this way:  The State is hostile or unfriendly to religion in its very
essence because religion and the State deal with two entirely separate  do-
mains. Believers who delude themselves  into thinking that the State might
be friendly to them commit themselves to operating in the State's domain
when their belief ought to commit them to operating only in religion's do-
main. They may accept accommodations when offered, for there the State
comes forward and, one might say, places itself within religion's  domain.
But seeking an accommodation  moves the believer in the wrong direction,
into the State's domain. 26
What  should be done when the believer is placed in the State's  do-
main?  This is the situation in the MozerFzand Amos"  cases.  In the former,
parents of children  attending public schools  found some course material
inconsistent with their religious beliefs, and asked the school to allow their
children to substitute equivalent  material;29 in the latter, the church  was
sued for discrimination and interposed a defense, relying on a statute that it
said should be interpreted to accommodate  the religious discrimination in
which it concededly  engaged?° I suggest that in both cases,  the believers
should in fact forgo the opportunity to seek accommodations from institu-
tions that might grant them if requested.
Consider Mozert first. Professor Carter refers  sympathetically  to the
parents.  They  do  have  an alternative  to  seeking  an accommodation,  of
course:  They can withdraw their children from the public schools and edu-
cate them in private, religiously  affiliated schools or at home. Their chil-
dren may avoid the material that troubled the parents as long as the private
school  or home-schooling  satisfies  the State's  regulatory  demands.  Of
course, the parents  would have to bear the costs  of private education  or
24.  See id.
25.  See id.
26.  In this connection I have some concern about Professor Carter's tone in discussing public aid
to non-public education. Consistent with my general view, I would be troubled by efforts by religiously
affiliated  schools to obtain such  aid. I also  doubt that it is possible to create any aid program without
leading such schools to make active efforts to get what they can from existing appropriations  and to
increase the appropriations for the program, efforts which would trouble me.
27.  Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
28.  Corporation  of the Presiding Bishop of the Church  of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints  v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
29.  See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
30.  See Amos, 483 U.S. at 331.
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home-schooling.  But they thereby  protect their religious beliefs and prac-
tices without conceding authority  over such beliefs to the State.  As I have
said, at some point the accommodation  will break down:  The State will
prescribe  a curriculum that the believers  simply  cannot provide,  or will
impose  certification requirements  on teachers  or parents that themselves
conflict with the demands  of religion. And then believers will indeed face
fundamental choices.  Yet, although the choices are fundamental, they need
not, and for believers  should not, be hard ones:  The State's regulatory de-
mands are to be resisted.
Amos presents a slight variant.  There the State had in fact enacted  a
statutory accommodation.3' I have suggested that the theological concerns I
am describing  would bar people  from seeking  accommodations  but not
from accepting them when offered. But what precisely is offered? That is a
question of statutory interpretation. The statute in Amos allowed religious
institutions  to discriminate  on the basis of religion.  The issue in the  case
was whether that accommodation  was available  when the discrimination
occurred in the  operation  of a non-religious,  non-profit  church  activity
(running a gymnasium). 32  The complainant  had a fair argument  that the
accommodation  should extend only to religious activities by the protected
institutions.  Does it move the church on to the State's  domain for its law-
yers  to argue that the accommodation,  properly interpreted, authorizes  an
exemption for the gymnasium's employment practices as well?
I am inclined to think that it does, though that is a very strong posi-
tion.  One might distinguish  between saying  to  the courts that the statute
does  not in fact reach  the gymnasium's  employment practices-that  is,
saying that  the legislature  has already accommodated  the church's  be-
liefs-and asking the courts  to provide an accommodation.  On the former
understanding,  the church is asking no one for an accommodation  but is
merely accepting the one the legislature offered, whereas on the latter, it is
asking the State, through its judicial  branch, for an accommodation.  But
this distinction seems too thin to me. If the statute is not transparent, as it
was. not in Amos, the church  is  asking the Court-again,  an  arm of the
State-to interpret  the statute.  And, I believe,  the theological  difficulty
arises from operating in the State's domain.
What would it mean to  say that defending against the discrimination
claim in Amos by asking the courts to choose between alternative reason-
able interpretations  of the statutory  accommodation  was  a theological  er-
ror?  Consider  the  outcome.  The  complainant  files  suit,  the  church
effectively refuses to defend because it forgoes the only defense available
to it, a default judgment is  entered, Amos seeks  enforcement,  the church
again does nothing, the State levies on church property, and so on-to the
31.  See id.
32.  See id. at 330-31.
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point when there is a real crisis between the church and the State.  The key
point to note here, to which Professor Carter alludes,  is that there is noth-
ing theologically  objectionable  about such crises  in themselves.  Indeed,
this sort of crisis  is familiar in the history of denominations such  as the
Mennonites. Members of those denominations have made it quite clear that
when a crisis such as this arises,  their religion requires that they go their
own way,  sometimes literally so.  Such crises  are not theologically  inter-
esting to believers. Rather, they put the question to the State:  What do you
truly want to  do?  And that is precisely  the point. Accommodations  are
something for the State to decide.  Religious  believers  are no more than
observers of the State's decisions within its domain; they are sovereign in
their own, or, more precisely,  are subjects of the Sovereign they acknowl-
edge.
I must acknowledge that the position I have sketched here may sound
like a celebration of religious oppression,  but it is not. Nor is it really  a
celebration of martyrdom. 33  I celebrate neither oppression nor martyrdom,
but I do not expect oppression to disappear either,  and so  do not expect
martyrdom  to disappear.  Accommodations  of religion  make  it easy  to
overlook the fact that oppression is a brute fact  about the pre-millennial
world. To acknowledge this is to take a strong position, one that many will
find difficult to sustain. It is far easier to hold out the hope that the State
will be friendly for long enough, and over enough matters, to let us live our
lives peacefully. And it will be-for some of us. But not for all. Those who
are temporarily  the State's friends need to see that there  are, right now,
some to whom the State is no friend at all.
And  even  those  to  whom  the  State  is  presently  friendly  should
know that they will be disappointed in the State someday. The question is
not  when  disappointment  will  occur,  but  when  believers  will
understand  that  disappointment  is inevitable.34  The theologically  based
anti-accommodationist  position I have sketched,  and to which  Professor
Carter appears to adhere, either makes that inevitability apparent or forces
those who do not yet acknowledge it to confront the proposition of inevita-
bility.  And, in the end, that is all to the good. For, to adapt a phrase from
33.  Professor  Carter's  "sneaking"  admiration  for Bob Jones  University  does,  I think, praise
martyrdom as such. I would not. As I understand them, Professor Carter's religious beliefs lead him to
conclude that the beliefs of those who control Bob Jones University are false, though sincerely held and
religious. But I do not see why one should have even a sneaking admiration for those who act on false
religious beliefs.  It is one thing to be a martyr for the true religion; it is another to be a martyr for a
false one. Believers must be able to draw that  distinction.
34.  I am reminded here of a character's  observation near the conclusion of Frangois Truffaut's
film Mississippi Mermaid  (United Artists & Les  Films Du Carrosse  1969), that she never knew  that
love could be so painful. So too with religion.
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Senator Daniel Moynihan,  to be a believer is  always  to have your heart
broken by the State.35
35.  It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  one  partial  remedy.  a  substantial  restriction  in  the  State's
regulatory  and  directive  activities,  of the  sort  desired  by  strong  libertarians.  Professor  Carter's
proposition, that we are who we are, seems to me a near-conclusive response to the libertarian program,
except to the extent that it does  not fully take into account the fact that we can change  who we are,
albeit slowly.
(Vol. 87:1117 1124